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Summary
Background:When we view a scene, we construct an internal
representation of the scene that extends beyond its given
borders. This cognitive phenomenon is revealed by a subse-
quent memory error when we confidently misremember the
extended scene instead of the original. This effect is known
as ‘‘boundary extension’’ and is apparent in adults, children,
and babies.
Results:Herewe show that seven patients with selective bilat-
eral hippocampal damage and amnesia, who cannot imagine
spatially coherent scenes, displayed attenuated levels of
boundary extension on three separate measures. Paradoxi-
cally, this reduced boundary extension resulted in better
memory for the stimuli compared with matched control partic-
ipants, because the patients’ recall was less encumbered by
the boundary extension error. A further test revealed that
although patients could generate appropriate semantic, con-
ceptual, and contextual information about what might be
beyond the view in a scene, their representation of the specif-
ically spatial aspect of extended scenes was markedly
impoverished.
Conclusions: The patients’ superior memory performance
betrayed a fundamental deficit in scene processing. Our find-
ings indicate that the hippocampus supports the internal
representation of scenes and extended scenes when they
are not physically in view, and this may involve providing a
spatial framework in scenes. We suggest that interference
with the ability to internally represent space may prevent the
construction of spatially coherent scenes, with possible con-
sequences for navigation, recollection of the past, and imagi-
nation of the future, which depend on this function.Introduction
Decades of animal work have shown that a brain structure
called the hippocampus plays an essential role in constructing
internal spatial representations of the environment [1–3]. In
humans, exactly how this spatial function relates to the
acknowledged importance of the hippocampus for recalling
past experiences [4] remains a key unanswered question in
neuroscience [2, 5, 6]. In recent years, the importance of the
hippocampus has been amplified further with the realization
that it is not only necessary for recalling the past, but also
enables imagination of fictitious and future scenes and events*Correspondence: s.mullally@ucl.ac.uk (S.L.M.), e.maguire@ucl.ac.uk
(E.A.M.)[7–9]. Hassabis et al. [10] found that patients with bilateral
hippocampal damage and amnesia could not imagine either
fictitious or future scenes (see also [11–14]); their construc-
tions were fragmented and lacked spatial coherence. This
led to the proposal that the hippocampus may facilitate the
construction of complex spatial contexts or scenes into which
event details are bound, and this scene construction process
may underpin functions such as navigation, recalling the
past, and imagining the future [6].
Here we sought to test the proposal that the hippocampus is
critical for scene construction in a novel way. When we view
a scene, we construct an internal representation of the scene
that extends beyond its given borders. This powerful cogni-
tive phenomenon is revealed in a memory error known as
‘‘boundary extension’’ (BE; [15]). Figure 1 illustrates this effect,
whereahealthyparticipant, havingstudiedapictureof asimple
scene, drew the scene from memory moments later and in-
cluded much more surrounding background than was present
in the studied stimulus. Interestingly for our purpose, BE
occurs specifically in relation to scenes, but not for single acon-
textual objects [16, 17].
Boundary extension is a robust effect apparent in all popu-
lations sampled—adults [15, 18], children [18, 19], and even
babies [20]. It involves a two-stage process. The first stage is
constructive in nature and occurs because when we initially
encounter a scene, we are not limited to the information that
is in front of our eyes, but have access to an automatically con-
structed and implicitly maintained internal representation of
the scene. This latter representation extends well beyond the
borders of the given scene and provides an overarching frame-
work into which we rapidly embed what is currently in our field
of view [21]. This is a highly adaptive process that supports our
experience of a continuous and coherent world, despite it
being amassed from discontinuous sensory input. That this
initial construction stage has occurred is revealed by a subse-
quent memory error at recall. Here, in the absence of the
studied view, we mistakenly attribute the anticipated informa-
tion in the extended scene representation as having been seen
before. The fact that the studied view need only be absent for
as little as 42ms for BE to be apparent [22, 23] underscores the
online and spontaneous nature of this effect.
Because BE captures something automatic and funda-
mental about our interaction with scenes, and necessarily
depends on intact scene construction ability, it is of interest
to determine whether patients with bilateral hippocampal
damage and amnesia show normal BE. If they exhibit BE
similar to control participants, it would suggest that they
have access to coherent scene representations beyond the
studied view. If, however, they show reduced or absent BE,
this may indicate a fundamental problem generating internal-
ized scene representations. Critically, the latter finding of
attenuated BE could not be attributed to a failure of memory
between study and test as, paradoxically, amnesic patients
would perform more accurately at recall than control partici-
pants, because their poor scene construction beyond the
edges of the given view would actually serve to minimize
BE. Thus, BE afforded us a unique opportunity to investi-
gate scene processing against the background of profound
Figure 1. A Demonstration of Boundary Extension
The left panel shows the studied photograph (i.e.,
a close-up view of a scene) and the right panel shows
the scene as subsequently drawn from memory
moments later by a control participant. The drawing
clearly depicts a more extended expanse of background
thanwas evident in the original stimulus (taken from [24]).
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262memory impairment, potentially offering additional lever-
age on the question of what function the hippocampus
performs.
We employed three classic tests of boundary extension.
The first was a modified version of a rapid serial visual presen-
tation (RSVP) task [23, 24], the second a drawing task [15, 25],
and the third was a haptic (tactile) BE paradigm [26]. The latter
enabled us to assess whether the same pattern of results
would be observed in another modality in the absence of
visual input. Given that BE is evident after even the briefest
intervals [22, 23], it was possible to adapt all three tasks for
use in memory-impaired individuals, such that recall was
always assessed immediately after the presentation of each
scene stimulus, thus eschewing a requirement for long-term
memory. We also devised a further ‘‘scene probe’’ test. This
was important because it allowed us to explore in detail the
nature of participants’ internal representations of what might
be beyond the current view for a given scene specifically
in terms of conceptual, contextual, and spatial sources of
information.
In order to functionally localize any effects to the hippo-
campus specifically, it is necessary to assess patients with
damage restricted to the two hippocampi alone (as far as
this is possible to establishwith current techniques).We tested
seven such patients whose selective, bilateral hippocampal
lesions were confirmed using high-resolution structural mag-
netic resonance imaging (MRI) coupled with two independent
measurement techniques (see Experimental Procedures;
see alsoSupplemental Experimental Procedures andFigureS1
available online). These predominantly young, high-func-
tioning patients had a selective and severe episodic memory
impairment (see Table S1) and a significant deficit in the ability
to imagine spatially coherent scenes. The question was, would
they show normal boundary extension?
Results
Scene Construction
We first assessed whether this group of patients would show
scene construction deficits similar to patients reported previ-
ously. Using an established paradigm [10], participants were
required to construct newly imagined fictitious scenes in re-
sponse to a verbal cue. The experiential index (a measure of
the richness of the imagined scenes) was significantly lower
in the patients (24.22 6 17.84) relative to controls (47.52 6
7.08; U = 6.0, Z = 23.04, p = 0.002) (Figure S2A). Similarly,
patients’ scenes were significantly more fragmented and less
spatially coherent (21.616 4.09) than those imagined by con-
trols (3.586 2.04; U = 13.5, Z =22.41, p = 0.016) (Figure S2B).
Therefore, just as with previous amnesic patients (e.g., [10]),
these new patients were also unable to imagine spatially
coherent scenes.Boundary Extension
Having established that our patients had
severe problems imagining spatially coherentscenes, we next tested boundary extension in three different
ways. All participants were naive to the concept of BE.
Rapid Serial Visual Presentation Task
Participants were presented with two scene pictures in rapid
succession separated by a briefly visible visual noise mask
(initial scene presentation = 250 ms; masked interstimulus
interval = 250 ms; Figure 2A) and were simply asked to rate
whether the second picture depicted a closer-up, the same,
or a farther-away view of the scene than was shown in the orig-
inal picture. Unbeknownst to participants, the two pictures
were always identical, and thus, all picture pairs should have
been rated as the same. However, on a high proportion of trials
in this type of task, healthy participants often rate the second
picture as closer-up than the first picture, thus exhibiting BE
[24]. This is because when they initially view a scene, partici-
pants typically imagine the extended environment surrounding
the scene [21]. When this more expansive representation is
subsequently compared with the second ‘‘test’’ picture,
although it is identical to the initial picture viewed only 250 ms
previously, the second picture is consistently believed to
depict a closer-up scene.
As anticipated, our control participants classified the
majority of trials as closer-up (61.1% 6 23.05%). By contrast,
the patients classified less than a third of trials as closer-up
(30.95% 6 22.8%) and significantly fewer than the controls
(U = 15.5, Z = 22.26, p = 0.024). In addition, patients correctly
identified 61.9% (622.36%) of trials as the same in comparison
to only 32.99% (621.2%) of trials classified as such by controls
(Figure 2B, see also Figure S3). Again, this difference was
significant (U = 14.5, Z =22.33, p = 0.02). Notably, the patients’
errors, when they made them, were not random, but were in
the same direction as the controls; i.e., they rated pictures as
closer up. Farther away classifications accounted for only
a small number of responses (patients: 7.14% 6 10.4%;
controls 5.9% 6 5.17%) and did not differ between groups
(U = 38.5, Z = 20.31, p = 0.76). Thus, the patients’ attenuated
BE was not simply because they failed to recall the studied
picture at test, because this would have led to an equal distri-
bution of responses across the three categories, which was
clearly not the case. Therefore, although both groups made
BE errors, controls made significantly more BE errors than
patients, presumably because when viewing a study picture,
their internal representation of the studied scene went well
beyond what was in front of them. By contrast, patients’
performance was significantly more accurate because their
impaired scene construction ability presumably diminished
their capacity to construct the extended scene representa-
tions, rendering their performance on this task less suscep-
tible to the BE error.
Participants also rated how confident they felt about each
decision in the RSVP task. Patients were significantly more
confident on trials they correctly identified as the same
Figure 2. Rapid Serial Visual Presentation BE Task
(A) Timeline of an example trial. The initial picture (i.e., a close-up photograph of a scene) comprised a single, nonoccluded, centrally positioned object and
was presented on the computer screen for 250ms, followed by a briefly presented (250ms) dynamically changingmask [23]. The second picture (which was
always identical to the original picture) immediately followed the mask. The task was to rate the second picture relative to the first. There were five options,
i.e., ‘‘much closer up,’’ ‘‘a little closer up,’’ ‘‘the same’’ (the correct answer), ‘‘a little farther away,’’ or ‘‘much farther away,’’ and participants completed
24 trials.
(B) The proportion of trials classified as either ‘‘closer up,’’ ‘‘the same’’ (correct answer), or ‘‘farther away’’ was calculated and represented as a percentage
response distribution score (percentage of responses made in each category relative to the total number of responses made). BE is revealed by dispropor-
tionally large number of incorrect ‘‘closer-up’’ responses. Overall, control participants made significantly more erroneous BE (i.e., ‘‘closer-up’’) responses,
whereas the patients made significantly more accurate (i.e., ‘‘the same’’) responses.
(C) Participants also reported how confident they were about their decision using a three-point scale (1 = ‘‘not sure,’’ 2 = ‘‘fairly sure,’’ 3 = ‘‘very sure’’) and
mean confidence ratings were calculated for each of the three response types. Control participants were significantly more confident when making
erroneous ‘‘closer-up’’ responses, and patients were significantly more confident about their correct ‘‘the same’’ response. An ‘‘I don’t remember seeing
that at all’’ option was also included but never selected. Data are presented as means 6 1 SEM; *p < 0.05. See also Figure S3.
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263(2.226 0.52; 1, not sure.3, very sure) relative to the trials they
erroneously identified as closer up (1.75 6 0.6; Z = 22.20, p =
0.028), whereas controls were significantly more confident
about their closer-up choices (2.3 6 0.46) than their ‘‘the
same’’ judgments (2.07 6 0.46; Z = 22.19, p = 0.028). Thus,
the groups’ confidence ratingsmirrored the patterns observed
in their task performance, with the patients being more confi-
dent about their correct responses, whereas the controls
were more confident about their erroneous (BE-influenced)
responses (Figure 2C).
Drawing Task
Having observed significantly attenuated BE in the RSVP task,
we then employed a completely different test to examine the
robustness of this finding. Participants studied photographs
of scenes, one at a time for 15 s, and then immediately drew
a scene from memory (Figure 3A). By examining the pro-
portional size of the drawn object relative to the original, we
obtained a quantitative measure of BE and an insight into
the extended scene representations driving the BE error
[15, 25, 27]. The control participants, as expected, included
more of the scene than was actually present in the originalstimuli, thus reducing the area covered by the object so that
it was only 61.16% of its original size (617.75%; t = 27.58,
df = 11, p = 0.001; Figure 3A). The patients also included
more of the scene than was shown, reducing the area covered
by the object so that it was 73.42% of its original size
(610.03%; t = 27.01, df = 6, p = 0.001; Figure 3A), but this
was significantly less of a reduction compared to the controls
(U = 17, Z = 22.11, p = 0.035, Figure 3B). Thus, the patients’
recall, despite their significant memory problems, was not as
vulnerable to distortion by the BE error, resulting in the pro-
duction of more proportionally veridical drawings than those
constructed by the controls.
Of note, a group of independent assessors blindly rated the
drawings, deciding whether each drawing was made by a
healthy control participant or a person with a memory prob-
lem. The patients and controls could not be differentiated in
terms of the overall quality of their drawings (see Supplemental
Experimental Procedures, and Figure S4). Another group of
independent assessors blindly rated the specific quality and
detail of the separate elements of the drawings (i.e., the
objects and the backgrounds). Again, there was no significant
Figure 3. BE Drawing Task
(A) The left panel displays the three scene stimuli. Each
scene photograph was surrounded by a 6 3 6 inch black
border and was studied for 15 s and immediately drawn
from memory in a 6 3 6 inch response square. Example
drawings by a patient and her two matched control
participants are displayed in the middle and left panels.
In both control participants’ drawings, more background
is clearly depicted thanwas present in the original stimuli.
This represents greater BE and was quantified in terms of
a percentage area decrease in object size (calculated by
tracing along the outer borders of the objects using
Adobe Photoshop C54 and measuring the area in pixels)
in the remembered relative to the original object size.
(B) Overall, patients showed significantly less boundary
extension than control participants. Data are presented
as means 6 1 SEM; *p < 0.05. See also Figure S4.
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264difference in the quality and detail of either the objects or the
backgrounds for patients and controls (see Supplemental
Experimental Procedures).
Haptic Task
The results of the twoBE tasks above revealed a reliable atten-
uation of the BE error in amnesic patients relative to control
participants.We thenwonderedwhether thesebetween-group
differenceswere restricted to the visual domain. In order to test
this, we utilized a haptic BE paradigm, which required partici-
pants to study and recall the dimensions of studied scenes
using touch alone (Figure 4A). A BE error results in the
misplacement of the borders so that the scene area at recall
is significantly larger than the original scene area, as indeed
was evident in the control group (mean 113.03% 6 11.6%;
t = 3.89, df = 11, p = 0.003, [Figure 4B]). Critically, the patients
failed to show BE (mean 95.5% 6 19.12%; t = 20.62, df = 6,
p = 0.56), and their performance differed significantly from
that of the controls (U = 17, Z =22.11, p = 0.035). The patients’
lack of BE in the haptic domain (i.e., in the absence of visual
input) argues against specific visuoperceptual scene deficits[28] or eye movement differences driving the
disparity between the groups.
Scene Probe Task
The scene construction and boundary exten-
sion results show that the patients had a signif-
icant difficulty with generating representations
of scenes and extended scenes. Scenes are
complex and comprise multiple elements, and
so using a scene probe task we also attempted
to ascertain what aspect of scenes might
be particularly compromised in these patients
with bilateral hippocampal damage. A close-
up photograph of a scene was presented to
participants on a computer screen (Figure 5A).
Participants were asked to describe out loud
a number of components of the scene. All
patients were able to provide confident and
accurate descriptions of the scene stimulus,
in line with those given by controls (see an
example response inFigureS5). This confirmed
that the patients had no difficulty in perceiving
pictures of scenes or providing rich narratives
[13]. In response to the question ‘‘What sort of
a place do you think this picture was taken
in?’’ the patients were able to locate the scenewithin an appropriate context (Patient A: ‘‘an urban sur-
rounding,’’ Patient B: ‘‘a park,’’ Patient C: ‘‘a cemetery or a
park,’’ Patient D: ‘‘a park or a village green,’’ Patient E: ‘‘a ceme-
tery or church grounds,’’ Patient F: ‘‘a square or a local park in
the middle of a city,’’ Patient G: ‘‘a small park in an urban
setting’’). This argues against the possibility that the patients
were unable to bring to mind relevant contextual associations.
Similarly, in response to the request to imagine taking a few
steps back from the camera’s current position and describe
the scene beyond the current view, patients were able to list
numerous contextually relevant items, associate them with
each other, and associate them with the context. In so doing,
thepatients showed that theywereclearly able toappropriately
attend to and anticipate what might be beyond the view in the
scene.
When their descriptions of what might be beyond the view
were formally assessed using an established protocol [10],
we observed no difference in the number of entities proposed
to be present beyond the view (U = 35, Z =20.60, p = 0.55), the
number of sensory descriptions (U = 32, Z = 20.88, p = 0.38),
Figure 4. Haptic BE Task
(A) Participants explored three distinct scenes, each pre-
sented within a wooden border (left panel), for 30 s using
touch alone. The border was then removed (upper right
panel) and participants (still blindfolded) were asked to
indicate the original location of each border using large
markers (right lower panel).
(B) BE was defined in terms of an increase in the recon-
structed scene area relative to the original scene’s size.
Compared to the control group, patients showed signifi-
cantly less boundary extension. Data are presented as
means 6 1 SEM; *p < 0.05.
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recounted by the patients relative to the control participants
(Figure 5B). However, in stark contrast to controls, patients
omitted spatial references almost entirely from their descrip-
tions of what was likely to be beyond the view (patients 0.43
6 0.79; controls 2.25 6 2.3; U = 18.5, Z = 22.08, p = 0.038).
Patients also rated the vividness of these extended imagined
scenes as significantly lower than controls (patients 1.0 6
1.41; controls 2.42 6 0.79; U = 18, Z = 22.16, p = 0.03; Fig-
ure 5C). In fact, most patients reported not being able to visu-
alize anything at all (see example in Figure S5). Thus, although
patients could provide rich semantic, associative, and contex-
tual information, they specifically could not imagine the spatial
structure of the scene, echoing their performance on the scene
construction task. They could not truly visualize what might be
beyond the current view.
Discussion
In this study we availed ourselves of a unique cognitive
phenomenon, boundary extension [15, 21, 29], whereby
healthy people consistently remember a greater expanse of a
scene thanwasshown in thegiven view. In contrast tomatched
controls, patients with apparently selective bilateral hippo-
campal damage and amnesia showed a striking attenuationof BE across three different tasks. Paradoxi-
cally, reduced BE meant that the amnesic
patients exhibited superior memory (an excep-
tional occurrence; see [30–34], and also [35,
36] for recent reviews) for the extent of the back-
ground context present in the stimuli. This result
enabled us to identify a specific deficit in scene
processing that cannot be attributed to a simple
failure of memory between study and test, sug-
gesting that the hippocampus supports the
internal representation of scenes (scene con-
struction) and extended scenes (boundary
extension) when they are not physically in view.
Because there are specific situations where
attention can attenuate BE [37, 38], we consid-
ered a number of alternative explanations for
our findings. Might it be that, given their diffi-
culties with spatial coherence in scenes, the
patients attended to the objects at the expense
of the background? If this was the case, then we
would have expected boundary errors to be
random (i.e., equal number of closer-up and
farther away responses in the RSVP task), and
poorer recall of background content. However,
this is not what we found. Patients’ errors,where they made them, were unidirectional and nonrandom
in both Experiment 1 (brief duration recognition test) and
Experiment 2 (longer duration recall task). Moreover, examina-
tion of the drawings from the second experiment showed that
patients clearly included the background surfaces in their
drawings (e.g., the pebbles behind the bananas) and did so
accurately. In fact, although differing in the amount of BE,
object details and background content were rated to be in-
distinguishable for the patients and controls when assessed
blindly by a group of independent assessors (see Supple-
mental Information). Moreover, the patients’ remarkable accu-
racy (mean of 95%) at replacing the borders in the haptic task
(a task that permits a large degree of error in terms of area
overestimation, see Figure 4A) suggests that the patients
attended to and retained the scene details across the testing
timeframe. Thus, explanations in terms of differential attention
or differential memory for details of the scene do not provide
a satisfactory account of our findings. Clearly patients, like
controls, recalled scene details and content; what differed
was how far beyond the edges of the view they falsely remem-
bered. Patients were less prone to making this error.
Scenes are complex and are composed of multiple ele-
ments. In this study, we also attempted to ascertain what
aspect of scenesmight particularly concern the hippocampus.
The results of the scene probe task provided clues in this
Figure 5. Scene Probe Task
(A) Depicts the scene stimulus used. Participants were asked to describe out loud a number of components of this scene, including the object and
background, and to name the type of place where the photograph was taken.
(B) They were also asked to describe what the scene might be like beyond the boundaries of the current view. Verbal descriptions were recorded and later
transcribed. Information content was classified into four categories according to an established protocol [10], namely entities present (EP), sensory descrip-
tions (SD), spatial references (SPA), and thoughts/emotions/actions (TEA). Relative to controls, patients produced significantly fewer spatial references in
these descriptions. There were no differences in the production of the other detail types.
(C) Participants were also asked whether they were actually able to visualize the extended scene in their imagination and to rate its vividness using a 3-point
scale (1 = low vividness, 2 =medium vividness, 3 = high vividness). If they were unable to visualize anything, they were given a score of 0. Compared with the
control participants, patients reported their imagined extended scenes were significantly less vivid. Data are presented as means 6 1 SEM; *p < 0.05. See
also Figure S5.
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generate a relevant narrative [13], and appropriately charac-
terize the context. When asked to imagine taking a step back
from the current position and describe what might then
come into view, patients’ performance was comparable to
that of the control participants; they listed contextually rele-
vant items in the extended scene, associated them with each
other, and related them to the context. Thus, the capacity for
basic semantic, conceptual, associative, and relational pro-
cessing was available to the patients. The preservation of
these processes, and the intact relationship between objects
and backgrounds evident in the patients’ performance on the
BE tasks, indicates that their reduced BE cannot be easily
accommodated by simple relational [39] or binding [40]
accounts.
The step-back aspect of the scene probe task also showed
that the patients did not have difficulty generating expectan-
cies or predictions about what scene features might be
beyond the view, which would have occurred if they could
not bring to mind predictable properties associated with the
environment. Instead, their self-declared problem was that
despite ‘‘knowing’’ what was likely to be there, they could
not visualize the space. This was confirmed by an objective
analysis of the descriptions of the imagined scene extension,
where the patients made virtually no references to space
compared with controls, whereas other element types (e.g.,
people or objects that might be present) were referred to
with similar frequency across the two groups.
The patients were impaired at scene construction and
in particular their imagined scenes lack spatial coherence.
When asked what they thought the problem was, they had
some insight; feedback included the following: ‘‘There is no
scene in front of me here. It’s frustrating because I feel like
there should be. I feel like I’m listening to the radio instead of
watching it on the TV. I’m imagining different things
happening, but there’s no visual scene opening out in front
of me,’’ ‘‘It’s as if I have a lot of clothes to hang up in a ward-
robe, but there’s nothing to hang them on, so they all fall on
the floor in a complete mess,’’ and ‘‘It’s hard trying to get the
space; it keeps getting squashed.’’ In conjunction with theboundary extension and scene probe findings, this suggests
that the legacy of bilateral hippocampal damage may be an
inability to internally generate a coherent spatial structure of
a scene or environment [41–43]. This accords with the view
that for hippocampal-dependent processing, space may be
particularly important [2, 3, 6]. We speculate that interference
with the ability to internally represent space may prevent the
construction of spatially coherent scenes, with possible con-
sequences for navigation, recollection of the past and imagi-
nation of the future, which depend on this function. Future
work will be needed to investigate this proposed link more
directly. Moreover, understanding how the construction of
spatially coherent scenes is achieved by the hippocampus,
the exact processes and/or representations that are involved,
will be critical. BE is an unusual phenomenon that is scene
dependent, and it is therefore difficult to conceive of an equiv-
alent temporal test, although consideration should also be
given to temporal context in future studies [44].
Boundary extension has received surprisingly little neuro-
scientific attention. Only one functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) study has examined BE, with a region-of-
interest analysis focused on two scene-relevant brain areas,
the parahippocampal and retrosplenial cortices [45]. Park
et al.’s [45] interest was not in the initial viewing of a scene,
the point at which the anticipation of the wider scene occurs,
but on retrieval (using an adaptation design), the point at which
the BE error is detected. Parahippocampal and retrosplenial
cortices responded to scenes and registered the BE error.
Given our BE findings and the fact that patients with selective
bilateral hippocampal damage cannot construct spatially
coherent scenes, we would predict that the hippocampus’
involvement is at the initial point of scene extension, although
no fMRI study has explicitly examined this as yet. The appar-
ently intact parahippocampal and retrosplenial cortices in
our patients, although contributing to scene processing in
other ways and perhaps able to compensate for the absent
hippocampus to a small degree (in that the patients did not
exhibit a complete absence of BE), could not rescue the
need to represent surrounding space in a scene, a function
we propose is specific to the hippocampus.
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Participants
Seven patients (three females, mean age 41.43 years, range 32–63 years;
mean Full Scale IQ 105, range 99–112) with severe memory impairments
associated with bilateral hippocampal damage were tested. Manual
segmentation of the individual medial temporal lobe regions (including
the hippocampus, parahippocampal, and entorhinal/perirhinal cortices) on
high-resolution structural MR images (Figures S1A and S1B), coupled with
whole-brain structural MRI and automated voxel-based morphometry
(VBM) analysis [46] (Figure S1C), were used to substantiate the selectivity
of the hippocampal lesions (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures).
Background and details pertaining to each patient are provided in
Table S1. All patients were high functioning with no problems in any cogni-
tive domain except memory (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures).
In addition, we tested two control participants who exactly matched each
patient (two patients, F and G, had similar profiles, and two of the controls
matched both of these patients), which gave us a total of 12 age-, sex-,
education level-, and IQ-matched control participants (four females, mean
age 42.67 years, range 32–63 years; mean Full Scale IQ 109, range
101–115; there were no differences between the groups for age: U = 34,
Z =20.68, p = 0.496; or IQ: U = 22.5, Z =21.66, p = 0.097). Only one patient
had been tested before in our laboratory (patient A, reported as P04 in [10]).
He had no memory of the tasks he performed previously. Each participant
gave informed written consent to participation in accordance with the local
research ethics committee.
Data Analysis
Data are presented as mean values 6 SD (and graphically in the figures as
means 6 1 SEM). For both the behavioral data and manually segmented
structural MRI data, statistical significance was calculated by looking at
differences in the ranked position order of the scores in the two groups
(Mann-Whitney U test). Changes in confidence levels (within subject) across
trial categories in the RSVP task were analyzed using the Wilcoxon signed-
rank test. Nonparametric statistical analyses were employed due to the
small number in our patient group (n = 7). The exceptions to this were
one-sample t tests used to assess whether group means on the drawing
and haptic tasks differed from a specified constant (i.e., 100%), because
no equivalent nonparametric task is available. All tests were two-tailed
and differences were considered statistically significant at p < 0.05.
Additional Tests
The Supplemental Experimental Procedures provides details of a test
examining visual illusions (see also Figure S6).
Supplemental Information
Supplemental Information includes six figures, one table, and Supple-
mental Experimental Procedures and can be found with this article online
at doi:10.1016/j.cub.2012.01.001.
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